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I.  INTRODUCTION
A.  Choking in Traffic
As a nation, we are increasingly stuck in traffic.  Motor vehicles
idling in rush-hour traffic contribute significantly to air pollution in
metropolitan areas.1  Traffic congestion has increased rapidly in
urban areas where the growth in volume of motorists has risen faster
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1. See RANDALL GUENSLER & DANIEL SPERLING, Congestion Pricing and Motor Vehicle
Emissions, in 2 CURBING GRIDLOCK 356, 368 (Transportation Research Bd. ed., 1994)
(predicting that increases in average vehicle operating speeds are likely to yield significant
reductions in carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emission rates); FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMIN.,
CONGESTION PRICING: GUIDELINES FOR PROJECT DEVELOPMENT i (1996) [hereinafter
Guidelines]; METROPOLITAN TRANSP. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA’S TRANSP. FUTURE 8-9 (1995).
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than the growth in roadway capacity.2  Due to the expected growth in
traffic and constraints in funding and space, there is a growing
realization that we cannot “build out of this” mobility dilemma.3  In
fact, recent news reports concerning an alarming rise in aggressive
motorist behavior, popularly called “road rage,” lay the blame on
motorists’ frustration with traffic congestion.4
One proposed solution to reducing traffic congestion, the
resultant air quality, and other negative impacts in already-distressed
metropolitan regions is to adopt congestion pricing.5  This would
require roadway users to pay for the congestion costs they impose on
other motorists during peak traffic hours.6  In theory, congestion
costs include lost time to other motorists, air quality impacts, added
noise, and lost fuel as a result of idling.7  In practice, congestion
pricing may not reflect the full costs associated with congestion
because the peak price is only set high enough to reduce peak-hour
trips substantially.8  Roadway space is an increasingly scarce resource.
Imposing a charge at times when space is most scarce may divert
some motorists from peak-hour use.  Alternatively, they may: (1) use
the roads at other times when the congestion price is not imposed; or
2. See DAVID J. OLSON, Pricing Urban Roadways: Administrative and Institutional Issues,
in 2 CURBING GRIDLOCK 216, supra note 1, at 216 (stating that transportation planners
generally define peak-hour congestion as the fraction of peak-period miles traveled on
roadways with volume-to-capacity ratios higher than 80%).  See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP.,
1995 STATUS OF THE NATION’S SURFACE TRANSP. SYSTEM—CONDITION & PERFORMANCE  20
(1995). In the New York-Connecticut-New Jersey metropolitan region, the growth in regional
road capacity has slowed from a rate of 62 miles per year in the 1950s to a mere 7 miles per
year over the past decade.  Under certain conditions, adding highway capacity may raise
environmental concerns as new roadways respond to the latent demand for more capacity.  See
ROBERT D. YARO & TONY HISS, A REGION AT RISK 155 (1996).
3. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at i; Glenn Collins, Economy Purrs in High Gear, But
Traffic Idles in Gridlock, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1997, at A1.
4. “Road rage” is aggressive driving associated with congested road conditions which has
been linked to an increase in traffic accidents.  See, Robert Cohen, “Road Rage” Hits the Gas
and Here’s Another Line: More Motorists Driven by Hostile Intentions, NEWARK STAR-
LEDGER, July 28, 1997, at 1 (describing increase in traffic accidents linked to angry motorists
stuck in traffic).
5. The pricing of roadways to discourage peak usage is hardly a new concept.  Urban
planners like William Vickrey of Columbia were early proponents dating back to the 1950s.
Hearings on the Transportation Plan for the National Capitol Region Before the Joint Comm. on
Washington Metro. Problems, 86th Cong. 454 (1959) (statement of William Vickrey); Columbia
University Colloquium, Pricing Transportation Right: William Vickrey’s Legacy, (Apr. 28,
1997).
6. See OLSON, supra note 2.
7. See id.
8. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REPORT ON THE CONGESTION PRICING PILOT PROGRAM
7 (1996).
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(2) use available mass transit or car pool arrangements when the
congestion price is in place.9
The timing for introducing congestion pricing is particularly ripe
because of the introduction of electronic tolls.  The new electronic
system is revolutionizing the manner in which tolls are collected on
major highways.10  The new system facilitates the imposition of
variable tolls to discourage road use during peak traffic periods by
reading an electronic card placed on the vehicle.11  Most importantly,
the system allows toll collection to proceed without the traditional
bottlenecks which resulted from manual collection.12  In the New
York-New Jersey region, as of October 1997, more than one million
motorists had signed up for what is called the “E-Z Pass” system—
ten times the number that was originally projected.13  For the nearly
400,000 daily users, E-Z Pass has nearly eliminated rush-hour delays
that had averaged twenty minutes.14
Despite these technological advances, the efforts made to date to
adopt congestion pricing have run into substantial local opposition.15
The failure to price roadways that experience congestion in many
ways follows the paradigm of the tragedy of the commons, in which
self-interested users ruin shared resources (e.g., roadways through
over-use, air quality) because they do not suffer the full consequences
of their actions.16
Part I of this article will address the policy justifications for
adopting congestion pricing on our most trafficked urban roadways.
The policy rationale for adopting congestion pricing can be found in
the failure to achieve the goals of the Clean Air Act17 through
traditional command and control mechanisms.  After nearly three
9. See id.
10. See YARO & HISS, supra note 2, at 172.
11. See P.L. Wyckoff, E-Z Pass Passes First GWB Test: 8,100 with Tags, NEWARK STAR-
LEDGER, July 29, 1997, at 15 (describing variable rates for frequent users of George
Washington Bridge); Kirk Johnson, A Flip Side to E-Z Pass: East River Tolls and Rush-Hour
Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1997, at B21.
12. See Johnson, supra note 11.
13. See James Rutenberg, The Driving is E-Z as Pass Use Soars, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct.
15, 1997, at 4.
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., Guidelines, supra note 1, at 20 (describing San Francisco’s failure to adopt
pricing after completing extensive evaluation and focus groups).
16. See Geoffrey Wilcox, New England and the Challenge of Interstate Ozone Pollution
under the Clean Air Act of 1990, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1996) (citing Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968)).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
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decades of regulation, the introduction of market incentives through
pricing of roadways should be seriously considered. Moreover, the
revenue generated by congestion pricing could alleviate the existing
deficits in mass transit availability that force travelers to use the most
polluting form of transportation—the motor vehicle.  Further, in
contrast to other measures, like penalizing the use of less fuel-
efficient vehicles or imposing a gasoline tax, congestion pricing is
likely to achieve wider acceptance because it is based on the neutral
principle of rationing roadway use where other transportation
alternatives to the roadway exist.
Part II will examine the obstacles to implementing congestion
pricing.  As we will see, these obstacles include: (1) the lack of
criteria to determine what is an appropriate roadway for congestion
pricing; (2) the lack of an appropriate price structure for a system of
congestion pricing;18 (3) the lack of popular support for pricing roads
for which previously there were no charges; (4) equity concerns that
those least able to afford to use the roadways will be those most
impacted by higher peak charges;19 and (5) the lack of sufficient
incentives for local agencies to move forward with congestion
pricing.20
B.  The Steady Increase in Vehicle Miles Traveled Degrades Air
Quality, In Spite of Reduced Tailpipe Emissions
Since 1968, Clean Air Act requirements have reduced
automobile tailpipe emissions by an astonishing 96 percent per
automobile.21  However, that percentage is deceiving.  First, the
simultaneous increase in the absolute number of vehicle miles
driven22 and the cumulative effect of emissions predating tailpipe
18. See CALIPER CORP., REGIONAL TRANSP. ECONS. STUDY: AUTO PRICING DEMAND
SIMULATION MODEL  59-61 (1995).
19. See MARTINE MICOZZI, FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMIN., AN IDEA GROWS IN
BROOKLYN: CONGESTION PRICING PUBLIC OUTREACH WORKSHOPS IN NEW YORK CITY 4
(1996).
20. See generally Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the
New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1656 (1991); Olson, supra note 2, at 218.
21. See Ronald J. Gregario, Success Obscured by Smog: The Regulation of Automobile
Pollution, 16 N.Y. ENVTL. LAW. 13 (May 1996).
22. For example, “In 1990, New Jerseyans drove a total of 59 billion miles, a figure that
has grown by 10 billion miles in each of the two previous decades.  That is a 50 percent increase
in twenty years… . Between 1960 and 1990, the state’s workforce grew 60 percent to well over 4
million jobs… .  [V]ehicle registrations in the state soared 150 percent to about 5.2 million.”
Neal Thompson, Roads to Ruin: Can We Afford to Close the Transportation Gap?  And Can We
Afford Not To?, N.J. REP.,  Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 18.  In 1994 alone, Californians drove 260
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regulation have resulted in only marginal improvement in ambient
air quality.23  Second, emission-control devices require periodic
inspection and maintenance, and EPA has estimated that only one-
third of automobiles have properly working systems at any given
time.24  Third, sport utility vehicles and mini-vans, defined as light-
duty vehicles under the Clean Air Act, represent a growing share of
the market and are not subject to the strict emissions mandates that
apply to automobiles.25  Fourth, the heavy-duty engines in trucks are
not as tightly regulated as the engines in automobiles.26  These
regulatory failures dramatize the need for a market-driven system of
congestion pricing to reduce vehicle miles traveled where mass
transit alternatives exist.
Despite the reductions in tailpipe emissions mandated by the
Clean Air Act, the automobile remains the single most important
source of air pollution in the United States.27  Currently, motor
vehicles are responsible for 75 percent of hydrocarbon emissions, 45
percent of nitrogen oxide emissions, and 34 percent of the volatile
organic compound emissions in the United States.28  The combination
of oxygen, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, and sunlight
leads to the formation of ground-level ozone.29  Ground-level ozone
                                                                                                                                     
billion miles, which is almost three times the number of miles they drove in 1974.  See David
Woodruff, Electric Cars: Will They Work? And Who Will Buy Them?, BUS. WK., May 30, 1994,
at 104, 105.
23. See Wilcox, supra note 16, at 4. In the summer of 1997 in New Jersey, ground-level
ozone exceeded Clean Air Act standards roughly twice as often as in the summer of 1996.  The
ozone level in New Jersey exceeded federal standards 211 times in 1997, compared with 130
times in 1996.  High Ozone Levels Occur More Often, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1997,
at B6.
24. See Gregario, supra note 21.
25. See Direct Final Rule Amending the Test Procedures for Heavy-Duty Engines and
Light-Duty Vehicles and Trucks and the Amending of Emission Standard Provisions for
Gaseous Fuel Vehicles and Engines, 62 Fed. Reg. 47114 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
86).
26. See id.
27. See Henry Waxman et al., Cars, Fuels, and Clean Air: A Review of Title II of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 1947, 1949 (1991); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Barry
Needlemen, Control of Air Pollution from Mobile Sources Through Inspection and
Maintenance Programs, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 409, 411 (1993).  By weight of pollutant,
automobiles are the greatest source of air pollution in the country.  See Michael T. Donnellan,
Note, Transportation Control Plans under the 1990 Clean Air Act as A Means for Reducing
Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 16 VT. L. REV. 711, 724 (1992).
28. They are also the largest source of these pollutants, and are responsible for nearly all
the carbon monoxide and one-half of the ozone pollution in the cities.  See Gregario, supra
note 22.
29. See American Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n. v. Commissioner, Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection,
31 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1994); see Wilcox, supra note 16, at 2.
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is the most pervasive air pollution problem in the nation.30  The sheer
growth in volume of automobiles combined with the growth in other
energy uses have kept ambient ozone levels high.31  Automobiles are
also a primary contributor to carbon monoxide emissions.32  In
addition, both in the U.S. and beyond our borders, motor vehicles
contribute significantly to global warming since they burn fossil fuels
which emit carbon dioxide.33
Motor vehicles present Americans with a conundrum.34  In 1990,
motor vehicles accounted for 88.2 percent of person miles traveled
(excluding school bus travel).35  On the one hand, they are central to
economic activity as the primary means of transportation and to
30. See Wilcox, supra note 16, at 4.  Ground-level ozone and stratospheric ozone pose two
distinct environmental problems.  Ozone in the upper atmosphere shields the planet from
harmful ultraviolet rays of the sun.  Depletion of stratospheric ozone by chlorofluorocarbons
and other pollutants raises the risk of disrupting the Earth’s protective atmospheric cover.
Ground-level ozone, however, is the cause of human lung injury, agricultural damage, and
other environmental problems. See id. at 1 n.1 (citing NATURAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
RETHINKING THE OZONE PROBLEM IN URBAN AND REGIONAL AIR POLLUTION (1991)).
31. Ozone levels are highest in summer due to the effect of sunlight.  The ozone season of
1995 was the worst since 1988 for Clean Air Act violations.  See Wilcox, supra note 16, at n. 26
(citing Gary Lee, High Ozone Levels Prompt Warnings to Stay Indoors; Readings Far Exceed
Federal Standards, W. POST, July 28, 1995, at A3 (noting that 28 states had violations halfway
through the season).  In the New York-Connecticut-New Jersey metropolitan area, the number
of vehicle miles traveled between 1970 and 1990 grew by an estimated 60%.  This growth
occurred in spite of the efforts of the Clean Air Act to discourage motor vehicle use in urban
areas.  See generally, Donnellan, supra note 27, at 729 (describing localities’ inability to reduce
motor vehicle use under the Clean Air Act).
32. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 17
F.3d 521, 524 (2d Cir. 1994); National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter,
61 Fed. Reg. 65,638 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) (proposed Dec. 13, 1996).
33. The greenhouse effect is caused by the build-up of carbon dioxide and water vapor in
the atmosphere.  Americans produce a disproportionate share of the world’s greenhouse gas
emissions. See Donnellan, supra note 27, at 720.  President Clinton has pledged that the U.S.
will play a leading role in reducing those emissions.  Transportation sources, primarily motor
vehicles, are responsible for about one-third of the nation’s carbon dioxide emissions.  See id. at
719.
34. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 17 F.3d at 524 (“The invention and proliferation of the
automobile has been a mixed blessing: its advantages are obvious and need no chronicling; its
disadvantages, most notably as a source of air pollution that threatens human health and well-
being, have become more and more apparent”).
35. See OFFICE OF HIGHWAY MANAGEMENT, FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION,
1990 NATIONWIDE PERSONAL TRANSPORTATION STUDY, EARLY RESULTS, PERSON MILES OF
TRAVEL BY MODE, 24 tbl. 6, cited in Charles Komanoff, Pollution Taxes for Roadway
Transportation, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 121, 124 n.1 (1994).  The emergence of the two-
income household has also exacerbated the congestion problem. In 1960, most families had one
car, and a mere 2.8% of households had more than two.  By 1990, almost 16 percent had three
or more cars.  See Thompson, supra note 22, at 18.
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Americans’ self-conception in a nation that spans a continent.36  On
the other hand, motor vehicles carry a distinct set of disutilities: air
and noise pollution, accidents, and congestion on major roadways.37
In December 1996, after reviewing voluminous health data and
in response to a lawsuit by the American Lung Association
challenging the existing standards, EPA proposed a tightening of air
quality standards for ozone and small particulates.  EPA concluded
that the existing ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air
Act for ozone and small particulates were not sufficiently protective
of public health.38  The rules were issued in final form in July 1997.39
Over the course of the last decade, the effects of ground-level
ozone on human health have been isolated in numerous studies which
measure respiratory function under controlled conditions.40  The
effect of EPA’s decision is to increase the number of regions in the
United States that are in severe nonattainment for these pollutants.41
Even before the new standards were promulgated, more than 50
million Americans lived in areas that failed to meet the ozone
threshold.42  In light of the tightening of standards for ozone and
36. See Komanoff, supra note 35, at 123.
37. See id.
38. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,716 (1996)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R pt. 50) (proposed Dec. 13, 1996); National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Particulate Matter, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,638 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50)
(proposed Dec. 13, 1996).
39. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (1997)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50); National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate
Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
40. See, e.g., Robert B. Devlin et al., Exposure of Humans to Ambient Levels of Ozone for
6.6 Hours Causes Cellular and Biochemical Changes in the Lung, 4 AM. J. RESPIR. CELL MOL.
BIOL. 72 (1991); Dalia M. Spektor et al., Effects on Ambient Ozone on Respiratory Function in
Active, Normal Children, 137 AM. REV. RESPIR. DIS. 313 (1988); Committee on Environmental
Health, Ambient Air Pollution: Respiratory Hazards to Children, 91 PEDIATRICS 1210, 1212
(1993)(criticizing existing ozone standard because it “contains little or no margin of safety for
children engaged in active outdoor activity”).
41. See generally, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, supra
note 39 (describing projected reductions in excess mortality and morbidity as a result of stricter
standards for particulates in major metropolitan nonattainment regions).  As of 1993, some 94
urban areas were out of compliance with federal standards for ozone.  Some 42 areas were in
non-attainment for carbon monoxide.  See TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, 1 CURBING
GRIDLOCK 49 (1994) (citing ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR
QUALITY EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT (1992)).
42. See Wilcox, supra note 16, at 6 n.33.  “Based on monitoring data from 1993-1995, EPA
estimates that 280 counties in thirty-four states will not meet the new ozone standard,
compared to 106 counties not meeting the current standard.”  EPA also estimates that “150
counties in thirty-one states will not meet the new PM [particulates] standard, compared to
forty-one counties currently in violation under the old standard.”  See Julie R. Domike,
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small particulates and the worsening problem of persistent
nonattainment in major metropolitan areas, the resulting pressure to
think creatively about ways to reduce motor vehicle use will be
enormous.43
C.  ISTEA Contains a Rarely-Used Funding Mechanism to Test and
Implement Congestion Pricing in Nonattainment Areas
In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act (“ISTEA”)44 which enables local transportation
agencies to distribute federal funds among all modes of
transportation, rather than exclusively for highway construction.
Under ISTEA, the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality
Improvement Program (“CMAQ”) was designed to expand the focus
and purpose of Federal transportation funding assistance to include
air quality improvement as a specific objective.45  The state and local
planning units, metropolitan planning organizations (“MPOs”) set up
to implement the statute, are authorized to use transportation funds
for the kind of long-range planning and “demand management” that
congestion pricing requires.46  Use of transportation funds in a
flexible manner to reduce motor vehicle usage is the explicit goal of
ISTEA.47  Pursuant to ISTEA, CMAQ provides funding for
transportation projects or programs that will contribute to attainment
of a national ambient air quality standard (“NAAQS”), primarily for
ozone and carbon monoxide.48
To date under ISTEA, a total of $31 million has been spent on a
series of congestion pricing pilot projects throughout the country.49
Although these programs are in their early stages, preliminary results
                                                                                                                                     
Changes to the Clean Air Act Program Affect State and Local Governments, ABA ST. & LOC.
LAW NEWS, Fall 1997, at 1, 2.
43. See, e.g., Tom Johnson, U.S. Clearing the Air …  Slowly: Asthmatics Fear New
Pollution Rules Won’t Help Too Soon, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, July 8, 1997, at 1; Gregario,
supra note 21, at 13 n.22.
44. 23 U.S.C. §§ 100-501 (1994).
45. See The Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement (CMAQ) Program of
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act—Guidance Update, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,890
(1996) [hereinafter CMAQ Program].
46. See id.
47. Telephone Interview with Michael Savonis, Team Leader for Air Quality Policy,
Federal Highway Administration (July 18, 1997).
48. See CMAQ Program, supra note 45.
49. Telephone Interview with John Berg, Team Leader, Congestion Pricing Program
under ISTEA, Federal Highway Administration (July 21, 1997); FEDERAL HIGHWAY
ADMINISTRATION, OVERVIEW AND STATUS REPORT: CONGESTION PRICING PILOT PROGRAM
(1997) [hereinafter Overview]; See discussion infra Part II (describing pilot programs).
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are promising.50  However, as we shall see, many of these pilot
programs remain in the study and design phase due to local
opposition to moving forward with implementation.51
II.  DISCUSSION
Part I—With New Stricter Standards to Meet under the Clean Air
Act, Policymakers Should Consider the Adoption of Congestion
Pricing of Major Trafficked Roadways
A.  The Clean Air Act Has Failed to Reduce Overall Automobile
Emissions, Because the Statute Has Not been Used to Address the
Root Problem of Growing Vehicle Use In Peak Travel Times
l.  Background
With the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,
Congress ushered in the modern era of air pollution regulation.52  The
Clean Air Act has been described as a “bold experiment” in
cooperative federalism, in which EPA “identifies the ends to be
achieved while the States choose the particular means for realizing
that end.”53  Despite the incentives and threats of sanctions contained
in the current statute, the end result at this juncture would appear to
indicate the limits of cooperative federalism.54  For the most part,
federal standards have not changed local habits.55
The 1970 Amendments required the federal government,
through the newly created EPA, to establish standards for specific
pollutants in ambient air.56  The amendments termed these standards
50. See Overview, supra note 49; see discussion infra Part II p. 109.
51. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 20-21 (describing local opposition to implementation
of congestion pricing programs); Latin, supra note 20, at 1656; Interview with Janine Bauer,
Executive Director, Tri-State Transportation Campaign, in New York, N.Y. (June 23, 1997).
52. See Marc Melnick & Elizabeth Willes, Watching the Candy Store: EPA Overfiling of
Local Air Pollution Variances, 20 ECOLOGY L. Q. 211 (1994).
53. Air Pollution Control Dist. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1075 (6th Cir. 1984).
54. See generally Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?  Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L. J. 1196 (1977).
55. See, e.g., YARO & HISS, supra note 2, at 155.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994).  A key event leading to increased study of air pollution
impacts caused by the volume of automobile emissions dates back to the connection made
between traffic jams to a football game in Berkeley, California, in November, 1949 and the
experiencing of severe eye irritation by fans and surrounding residents.  A local committee that
studied the air quality at the time ruled out the possibility of increased industrial activity in the
Bay Area that might have contributed to the problem.  See Gregario, supra note 21.
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the primary and secondary NAAQS.57  EPA has since adopted
NAAQS for six pollutants: sulfur oxides, lead, ozone, nitrogen
oxides, carbon monoxide, and particulates.58  Motor vehicles emit
four of the primary pollutants for which NAAQS have been issued:
volatile organic compounds (which react with nitrogen oxides to form
ground-level ozone); carbon monoxide; sulfur dioxide; and
particulates.59
The original deadlines set in the 1970 statute were ambitious but
ultimately unrealistic, and for the most part were not attained by the
States.60  The central lesson of the statute is that good
implementation, rather than good legislative intentions, is the key to
effective environmental protection.61  In fact, some areas’ air quality
actually declined after the statute’s passage.62
The current deadlines for attainment vary depending on the air
pollutant and the degree of nonattainment.  Regions in severe
nonattainment for ground-level ozone, like the New York tri-state
metropolitan area, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia,
must reduce their emissions of volatile organic compounds by 3
percent per year.63  Local resistance remains strong to the kinds of
stringent measures which would achieve such reductions, e.g., no new
stationery sources which would emit VOCs, massive carpooling, and
shifts in working hours.64  Attainment of the new stricter NAAQS
within the statutory deadline of 2007 for areas in “severe”
nonattainment is therefore considered highly unlikely.65
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7409.
58. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (1990), cited in Latin, supra note 20, at 1669 n.60.
59. See Kenneth Small & Camilla Kazimi, On the Cost of Air Pollution from Motor
Vehicles 2 (Sept. 1994) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
60. See Latin, supra note 20, at 1657, n.19.
61. See id.
62. See generally Wilcox, supra note 16, at 8 (describing how the Clean Air Act has been
“an unwieldy tool to address a complex problem”).
63. See STATE OF NEW JERSEY, STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN REVISION FOR THE
ATTAINMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY
STANDARDS 11 (1993); see also Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation
Plans; Virginia; 15 percent Rate of Progress Plan for the Metropolitan Washington, D.C. Area,
62 Fed. Reg. 11,395 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (requiring additional
documentation to demonstrate affirmatively that the 15% emission reduction target will be
realized).
64. See Latin, supra note 20, at 1685 (noting that in some areas ambient ozone levels are
so high that states would need to adopt every feasible control measure to meet the attainment
deadline).
65. See generally Leslie Harrison Reed, Jr., California Low-Emission Vehicle Program:
Forcing Technology and Dealing Effectively with the Uncertainties, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
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2.  The States Have Not Succeeded in Reducing Automobile Use
To achieve the NAAQS within the established time limits, the
Clean Air Act requires each state to adopt and submit for EPA
approval a State Implementation Plan (“SIP”).66  Each SIP must
specify the state and local procedures and regulations that will enable
all areas within the state to achieve and maintain the primary and
secondary NAAQS.67  The SIP must also include emission limitations,
a program for enforcement, and provisions prohibiting emissions that
prevent attainment of the NAAQS.68  For nonattainment areas, the
SIP must require the sources to use “reasonably available control
measures” and must provide for “reasonable further progress”
toward attainment.69  Further, the SIP must comply with extensive
provisions applicable only to ozone nonattainment areas.70
The SIP has proven to be an ineffective tool to improve air
quality as highway construction and other local projects that may
increase total emissions go forward and are incorporated in the SIP.71
In July 1996, EPA issued warnings to ten industrialized states with
serious air quality problems that their SIPs failed to achieve sufficient
progress in improving air quality under the statute.72  In a recent
letter dated April 1997, EPA Assistant Administrator Mary Nichols
informed twenty-seven states that they needed to achieve additional
air emission reductions.73  This illustrates the systemic failure of the
Clean Air Act to achieve its stated goals of emission reductions.74
                                                                                                                                     
REV. 695, 695-97 (1997).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (1994). The Clean Air Act’s treatment of each state as a separate
unit is paradoxical since air pollutants, like ozone, are transported across state boundaries by
wind and other weather conditions.  See Wilcox, supra note 16, at 2,4,8.  In fact, transport from
the Midwest of airborne nitrogen oxides, a precursor chemical for ozone, may be the largest
source of nitrogen pollution in the Chesapeake Bay.  See id. at 2 n.7 (citing Todd Shields,
Scientist Tracks Bay Pollution Back to States in the Midwest, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 30,
1996, at B1).
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a).
68. See id.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c) (1994).
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511 (1994).
71. See NEW JERSEY TRANSPORTATION PLANNING AUTHORITY, AIR QUALITY
CONFORMITY 44 (1995) (incorporating highway extensions and roadway widenings as part of
submitted plan).
72. See Final Rule Making Findings of Failure To Submit Required State Implementation
Plans for Nonattainment Areas for Ozone, 61 Fed. Reg. 36,292 (1996) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 52).
73. The states were Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Georgia,
Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  See Dave Ryan,
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3.  The Transportation Control Plan Places an Unrealistic
Burden on the States to Reduce Motor Vehicle Use
The States may place limits on automobile emissions through the
use of transportation control plans to reduce motor vehicle use.  With
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress has again attempted
to restore the transportation control plan to its earlier prominence as
a means for reducing vehicle miles traveled.75  However, as with
earlier efforts in the 1970 statute, the transportation control plan in
the 1990 Amendments has not resulted in significant motor vehicle
emission reductions.76
The most significant change in the 1990 Amendments links the
withholding of federal highway grants to improvement in air quality.77
The 1990 Amendments also contain a detailed array of transportation
control measures that states may adopt.  These include: (1) programs
for improved public transit; (2) restriction of certain roads or lanes to
passenger buses or high occupancy vehicles; (3) employer-based
transportation management plans; (4) trip reduction ordinances; (5)
traffic flow improvement programs that achieve emissions reductions;
and (6) trip-reduction incentives.78  But experience to date with the
transportation control plan suggests that state and local planners
have not used it effectively to reduce vehicle miles traveled.79  In
addition, EPA has had little appetite for imposing sanctions on local
government entities, the very partners on whom it relies for
implementation of the statute.80
Although the transportation control plan could include
congestion pricing, as described in Part II of this article, such pricing
has been adopted in only three localities across the country.  Those
transportation control plans which have been adopted have not
                                                                                                                                     
EPA Cites States That May Need to Reduce Air Emissions to Protect Regional Health-Protection
Systems, EPA PRESS ADVISORY, APRIL 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 188144.
74. See Small & Kazimi, supra note 59, at 21.
75. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7515 (1994).
76. See Reed, supra note 65, at 695-96.
77. See Latin, supra note 20, at 1707.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f)(1)(A) (1994).
79. See, e.g., NORTH JERSEY TRANSPORTATION PLANNING AUTHORITY, REGIONAL
TRANSPORTATION PLAN 5 (1995) (describing Federally funded projects that “contribute” to
emissions reductions).
80. See Latin,  supra note 20, at 1707; Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, Clean Air,
ISTEA, and New York Transportation, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL, June 29, 1992, at 3, 4 (predicting
that “(u)nfortunately, the signs are not good that full compliance with the (Clean Air Act) will
be achieved”); Telephone Interview with Michael Savonis, Team Leader for Air Quality
Policy, Federal Highway Administration (July 11, 1997) (describing two isolated instances in
counties in Montana and Missouri, where sanctions were imposed).
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reduced motor vehicle use because incentives like high-occupancy
lanes and restricted parking rules have not been sufficient to deter
peak use of major roadways.81
4.  The Clean Air Act’s Regulation of Motor Vehicle Emissions
Has Not Resulted in Improvements in Air Quality, and EPA has
been Rebuffed in its Attempt to Force More Stringent Emissions
Reductions on the States
The mandating of cleaner cars and cleaner fuel has gone forward
in fits and starts because of resistance from the automobile industry
and litigation challenging EPA’s attempts to impose stricter
standards.82  In contrast to stationary sources, state power to limit
emissions from mobile sources is restricted, even though mobile
sources contribute significantly to ambient air quality violations.83
Automobile tailpipe emissions are regulated under a separate
provision of the Clean Air Act.84  Unlike the process for setting
NAAQS,85 regulators setting mobile source standards may consider
such factors as cost, technological feasibility, and the availability of a
sufficient number of automobiles to satisfy consumer demand.86
Despite resistance from the automobile industry, EPA has
promulgated standards requiring automobiles to use cleaner fuel.87
With one exception, the Clean Air Act prohibits states from further
regulating tailpipe emissions by an explicit preemption clause.88  The
one exception is California, for which there is a specific waiver
provision because of the unique severity of its air pollution problems
and its history of aggressive state regulation predating the passage of
the Clean Air Act in 1970.89  Consequently, there can be only two
types of cars “created” under emissions regulations in this country:
81. See Increased Flexibility Proposed for States on Conformity in Transportation Projects,
ENV’T REP. (BNA) 558 (July 12, 1996) (describing EPA proposal to give states additional
flexibility in implementing Clean Air Act requirements).
82. See, e.g., Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1401 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (1994).
84. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7574 (1994).
85. The NAAQS are health-based thresholds set by EPA for six “criteria” pollutants:
ozone, carbon monoxide, particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and lead.  40
C.F.R. pt. 50 (1990), cited in Latin, supra note 20, at 1669 n.60.
86. See Donnellan, supra note 27, at 724.
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b).
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).
89. See id.
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“California” cars and “Federal” i.e., EPA-regulated cars.90  Other
states cannot force manufacturers to create a “third vehicle.”91
Recently, EPA issued a rule which sought to compel twelve
Northeastern states to adopt California’s Low-Emission Vehicle
Program92 on the grounds that their SIPs contained inadequate
controls to reduce motor vehicle emissions.93  In a clear blow to EPA,
the D.C. Circuit found that the federal agency lacked the statutory
authority to compel the states to adopt the California Low-Emission
Vehicle Program.94  In so holding, the Court reasoned that the Clean
Air Act did not enable EPA to force particular control measures on
states to ensure compliance with the statute, even if the SIPs were
found to be lacking.95  This decision is likely to further slow the
introduction of low-emission vehicles outside California.
5.  The Zero Emission Vehicle, Under Development in
California, is Unlikely to Achieve Market Penetration in the Near
Future
In California, mobile sources cause nearly 60 percent of
hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides, which react with sunlight to form
harmful ozone, and 90 percent of the carbon monoxide emissions.96
Consistent with the trends in the rest of the nation, and in spite of
increasingly stringent emissions controls, this huge share of total
emissions occurs because of the increasing number of motor vehicles
and vehicle miles traveled.97
California’s current “Clean Fuel/Low-Emission Vehicle”
program requires the use of Zero Emission Vehicles (“ZEVs”).98  For
the foreseeable future, the only vehicles able to meet the zero
emission requirement are those powered by electric motors.  The
program remains an important model for future motor vehicle
emission reductions.  By this year, manufacturers in California are
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (1994); American Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Commissioner, Mass.
Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 31 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1994).
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 7507; American Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n, 31 F.3d at 21.
92. The California Low-Emission Vehicle Program (“LEV”) is the most stringent
regulatory program for new motor vehicles.  It requires the staged reductions in nitrogen
oxides and volatile organic compounds, the two precursors which form ozone, in new vehicles.
See Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
93. See id. (citing 60 Fed. Reg. 4712, 4713 (1995)).
94. See id. at 1410.
95. See id.
96. See Reed, supra note 65, at 695.
97. See id. at 695-96.
98. See Gregario, supra note 21, at 14 (citing Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 90, No. 32-Z).
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required to market ZEVs in amounts that represent 2 percent of their
sales.99  By 2001, the percentage is to climb to 5 percent of total sales;
by 2003, it is to rise to 10 percent of sales.100  However, in light of
manufacturers’ resistance and ongoing litigation concerning whether
other states may adopt this program, progress in implementation
beyond the State of California is expected to take many years and be
halting at best.101
6.  Congestion Pricing as a Mechanism for Reducing Road Usage
and Motor Vehicle Emissions
In contrast to the regulatory roadblocks we have examined,
congestion pricing does not require the heavy hand of regulatory
commands but rather relies on pricing to alter pollution-creating
behavior.102  Air travel, train travel, and other modes of
transportation are priced based on peak usage.103  Only roads,
carrying millions of pollutant-emitting motor vehicles, have by
tradition been “free.”  ISTEA specifically authorizes the piloting and
funding of congestion pricing projects, although, with a few
exceptions discussed herein, localities to date have not gone forward
with them.104
In 1993, the number of vehicle miles traveled on highways
reached 2.3 trillion, an increase of 3.4 percent per year since 1983.105
From 1975 to 1987, the percentage of peak-period miles traveled on
interstate highways with volume-to-capacity ratios higher than 80
percent jumped from 42 to 63 percent; in the space of two years, from
1985 to 1987, the rush hour traffic classified as congested by the
Department of Transportation rose from 61 to 63 percent.106
Discouraging the peak usage of automobiles on major urban
roadways, particularly where mass transit alternatives are available,
would reduce motor vehicle use at those times of day when pollution
99. See id. at 15.
100. See id.
101. Telephone Interview with Michael Savonis, supra note 74.
102. See Olson, supra note 2, at 216.
103. See DAVID GILLEN, Peak Pricing Strategies in Transportation, Utilities, and
Telecommunications, in 2 CURBING GRIDLOCK 115, supra note 1, at 115-34 (1994).
104. See generally Overview, supra note 49.
105. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 1995 STATUS OF THE NATION’S
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM: CONDITION & PERFORMANCE 5 (1995).
106. See ANTHONY DOWNS, STUCK IN TRAFFIC: COPING WITH PEAK-HOUR TRAFFIC
CONGESTION 1 (1992).
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impacts and lost traffic time are most problematic.107  The number of
trips undertaken is important from an emission modeling standpoint
because the emission levels of all pollutants are elevated during the
first few minutes of operation.108  Cold-start and hot-start emissions
(from idling vehicles) are also important contributors to the on-road
emissions inventory.109  In 1987, cold and hot-start operations from
the automobile fleet in the Los Angeles basin were estimated to
contribute about 27 percent of hydrocarbon emissions, 35 percent of
carbon monoxide emissions, and 19 percent of nitrogen oxide
emissions.110
It is only recently that the concept became administratively
feasible with the introduction of electronic tolls and computerized
toll cards.111  The pricing of roadways on an incentive basis has long
been the province of academics and urban planners.112 Congestion is a
classic negative externality.  As additional road users occupy the
road, the quality of service provided to all users declines.113  When
drivers use a highway, they do not pay the costs they are imposing on
other drivers by adding to their delay.114  The only “costs” incurred by
the single driver are running costs and her own time delay.115  Traffic
should flow smoothly at the speed limit.116  As traffic increases,
however, the eventual addition of one more vehicle will slow the flow
and increase the travel time of other vehicles.117  At this point,
congestion begins.118  The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey,
the bi-state transportation agency that runs the three bi-state
crossings, the George Washington Bridge and the Holland and
Lincoln Tunnels, has estimated that at those three crossings drivers
collectively experience a total of about 8,000 hours of toll plaza
delay.119
107. See GUENSLER & SPERLING, supra note 1, at 356-57.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See Overview, supra note 49, at 8; David S. Dahl, Primer on Congestion Pricing,
FEDGAZETTE, April 1996, at 3.
112. See DOWNS, supra note 106, at 60.
113. See Dahl, supra note 111 at 1.
114. See Olson, supra note 2, at 216.
115. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at i.
116. See Dahl, supra note 111, at 1.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See CALIPER CORP., supra note 18, at 1.
Spring 1998] BREAKING THE LOGJAM 197
David Dahl has used cost curves to illustrate the congestion
phenomenon and the social costs which result (see Chart 1):
The vertical axis measures the costs per vehicle mile, and the
horizontal axis measures trips per hour.  The curve, labeled
private costs PC, includes the costs drivers impose on
themselves such as gasoline and oil usage, and wear and tear
on automobiles.  The other curve, labeled social costs SC,
includes PC plus costs that each driver imposes on all others.
     On the horizontal axis to the left of N0 the curves coincide,
and cars travel at the speed limit.  But to the right of N0,
congestion sets in, and the two curves separate and slope
upward.  PC shows how a driver’s costs increase as speeds
drop below the limit and travel times increase.  SC rises at a
faster rate than PC because the additional drivers increase
the gasoline, oil, time and other costs to all other drivers . . . .
     Highway usage is where the supply curve bisects the
demand curve, labeled D (see Chart 2).  From the demand
curve’s viewpoint, the costs per vehicle mile, C, indicate the
prices motorists would pay for a given number of trips on a
highway.  D is downward sloping, indicating the higher the
price the fewer trips taken.  Prices also reflect the benefits a
driver receives from a trip.
     If usage of the highway is free to drivers, then N number
of trips will be taken, the point where D bisects PC.  Up to
that point, drivers’ willingness to pay for trips exceeds their
private costs, and beyond it they do not. At N, however,
travel is underpriced because drivers pay C for trips instead
of C**, the price which includes the congestion costs
imposed on other drivers . . . .
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     If drivers are required to pay for the congestion they
impose on other drivers, N* becomes the optimal number of
trips.  This is where D intersects SC.  Travel times decrease
as N-N* fewer trips are taken.120
This assumes that drivers are sensitive to price and that demand
is elastic. If the price is raised to sufficient levels to affect roadway
use at peak hours, the limited studies and data available, discussed in
Part II, suggest that this is a sound assumption. 121
Part II—Obstacles to Implementing a System of Congestion
Pricing Are Surmountable
A.  Under what circumstances is congestion pricing appropriate?
Congestion pricing may take a number of forms.  Single facility
pricing might involve a bridge, tunnel, highway, street or intersection.
Multiple facility pricing may take place in a corridor, or involve core
areas or regionwide applications. Corridor pricing might include a
major highway and parallel arterials.  In all of these approaches, price
levels and differentials should be set high enough to have a
significant effect on congestion.122
How does one define a heavily trafficked roadway?  A plausible
definition would cover major arteries in all urbanized areas with
populations over 200,000, where the ratio of use to capacity exceeds a
certain percentage at peak travel times.  This is an appropriate
threshold because ISTEA, which provides funding for congestion
pricing pilot programs, defines urbanized areas as those with
populations over 200,000.123
There is limited data indicating whether roadway users are price-
sensitive and thus likely to reduce their use of roadways when tolls
reflect the true costs of using the roadway.  However, the available
data suggests that congestion pricing with moderate toll increases
during peak usage would have substantial impacts on reducing
congestion.124
120. Dahl, supra note 111, at 1-2.  Graph and text reproduced with permission of the
author.
121. See generally Gillen, supra note 96, at 117 (describing “broadly based agreement
among the academic community” that road pricing would ease congestion on U.S. streets,
highways and urban expressways).
122. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at i.
123. See 23 U.S.C. § 134(i)(1) (1994).
124. See CALIPER CORP., supra note 18, at 59.
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The most effective way to test such a system would be through
pilot testing. To date, pilot programs have been initiated on roadways
identified as heavily trafficked, where public acceptance of
congestion pricing is likely to be higher than if the roadway were not
perceived as a problem by peak-hour users.125  Short of pilot testing,
in 1994, the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, conducted
an in-depth survey of users of the George Washington Bridge, the
Holland Tunnel, and the Lincoln Tunnel.  For these crossings, the
cash automobile toll is $4.00 at all facilities.126  The toll is paid in one
direction only and is effectively a round-trip toll.127  According to a
survey of roughly 4,700 bridge and tunnel users, a peak price of $6.00
at the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels between the peak hours of 6:00
a.m. and 9:00 a.m. would reduce morning peak delays by roughly 30
percent.128  This is a significant reduction in travel delays, with a price
increase of 50 percent.  The survey did not quantify the projected air
quality improvements, but they would be expected to be significant in
light of the disproportionate impact that idling vehicles have on air
quality, compared to vehicles moving at the speed limit.129
Under ISTEA, congestion pricing pilot programs are currently
underway in San Diego, Orange and Sonoma Counties, California,
Houston, Texas, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Fort Myers, Florida,
Portland, Oregon, Boulder, Colorado, and Westchester County, New
York.  With the exception of the Orange County, San Diego, and
Westchester County programs, the remaining programs are in the
study/design phase and have yet to be implemented.130  What follows
is a brief description of the leading programs.
1.  Orange County, California - State Road 91
The congestion pricing program on State Road (“SR”) 91 is of
particular interest.  This project, which is the first of its kind, is the
product of a private sector consortium and thus did not suffer the fate
125. See Overview, supra note 49, at 8 (describing public acceptance of congestion pricing
on congested roadway into Los Angeles).
126. See CALIPER CORP., supra note 18, at 1.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 57; see also id. at 5 n.1.
130. The projects in Houston, Texas and Minneapolis, Minnesota are expected to
commence in late 1997.  The Fort Myers, Florida project is approved for implementation in the
spring of 1998.  Telephone Interview with John Berg, Team Leader, Federal Highway
Administration (Sept. 29, 1997).
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of other projects which died for lack of approval by local officials.131
SR 91 provides a major commuter link between residential and
employment centers in Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino
Counties.  From 1980 to 1994, the existing eight-lane highway
experienced an annual compound traffic growth rate of 6 percent to
reach 255,000 daily vehicles.132  Beginning in December 1995, the
State contracted with a private operator to construct, finance, and
operate a project which would add four new lanes of capacity, termed
“ExpressLanes,” along 16 kilometers in the median of the highway.133
To encourage ridesharing, vehicles with three or more
passengers are exempt from the ExpressLanes tolls.  All others pay
for using the ExpressLanes.  The costs vary by time of travel, ranging
from $.50 to $2.75 per trip.134  In addition, frequent users were
allowed to pay a $15.00 monthly fee and receive a $.50 discount per
trip, independent of time of day.135  All fares are automatically
deducted from each customer’s pre-paid account using electronic
“read-write” transponders mounted on the car windshield.
Currently, over 86,000 motorists have established an ExpressLanes
account and are equipped with transponders.136
In its first year of operation, the ExpressLanes concept has been
well-received by the community.  A recent poll conducted by the
California Polytechnic Institute at San Luis Obispo indicates that the
project is given favorable ratings by 65 percent of the ExpressLanes
customers, 62 percent of the free ExpressLanes users, and 53 percent
of the drivers in the adjacent freeway lanes.137  ExpressLanes users
reportedly can save up to twenty minutes in commute time.138  The
movement of single-occupant vehicles into priced lanes has made a
measurable improvement in traffic flow in the “free” lanes.  The
facility’s operator, the California Private Transportation Company,
indicates that over 5.7 million vehicles were carried on the facility
131. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 20. Since SR 91 is a private consortium, it is not an
official “pilot project” receiving federal funding under the ISTEA program, but its progress is
being monitored by ISTEA staff.  Telephone Interview with John Berg, supra note 130.
132. See Overview, supra note 49, at 8.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See Overview, supra note 49, at 8.
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during 1996, with just under 1 million trips during the first quarter of
the year, to nearly 2 million trips during the year’s fourth quarter.139
2.  San Diego - Interstate 15
On December 2, 1996, an existing 13 kilometer HOV facility in
North San Diego was opened to a limited number of paying single
motorists during morning and evening peak hours.140  Prior to
December 1996, usage of the HOV facility was limited to carpools of
two or more passengers, which resulted in underuse of the facility.
With the start of this project, carpools ride at no charge, and single
motorists use the HOV lane at a monthly rate.141  This rate began at
$50 and was raised in March 1997 to $70.142
A recent report by the San Diego local planning unit indicates a
steady increase in permit sales for the use of the HOV lane143 in spite
of increases in the price of the monthly permit. Ninety-four percent
of those surveyed used I-15 to get to and from work, indicating that
steady users valued the time savings involved in using the HOV
service.144
3.  Westchester County, New York
The Tappan Zee Bridge is a major east-west link into lower
Westchester County and New York City.  Peak-hour congestion is a
persistent problem on the bridge, with volumes in the range of 7000
vehicles per hour during the morning peak period.145  In July 1997,
peak-period fees were introduced for trucks using the Tappan Zee
Bridge.146  Under the new pricing arrangement, truck tolls were
essentially doubled, with the average tolls (on a per-axle basis) going
from $10 per vehicle to $20 during the peak morning hours.147  New
York State, working with local transportation planners, recently
began a study of congestion pricing among all vehicle users on the
Tappan Zee and at a key Thruway crossing at Spring Valley, north of
139. See id.
140. See id. at 6.
141. See id. at 7.
142. Telephone Interview with Karen Schmidt, Program Administrator, Federal Highway
Administration (Aug. 26, 1997).
143. See SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS (SANDAG), I-15 CONGESTION
PRICING PROJECT 5 (1997).
144. See id. at 7.
145. Telephone Interview with Will Ristau, Transportation Analyst, New York State
Thruway Authority (Aug. 5, 1997).
146. See id.
147. See Overview, supra note 49, at 16.
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Westchester County.148  The study is slated for completion in mid-
1998.149
4.  Houston,Texas
Beginning in late 1997, 21 kilometers of Interstate 10’s Katy
Freeway’s HOV facility in Houston, Texas will be opened during
peak hours to carpools of two passengers (HOV-2) for a fee of $2.00
per trip.150  The implementation of this project is a result of a two-
year feasibility study funded by the Federal Highway Administration
Congestion Pricing Pilot Program.151  The project, to be marketed as
“QuickRide,” will be fully automated using windshield-mounted
transponders to deduct the $2.00 charge from qualified, two-person
carpools.152  The project will include a monitoring and evaluation
effort to compare data collected before and after implementation of
the project.153
5.  San Francisco Bay Bridge
The San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge was the first congestion
pricing project approved under the ISTEA Congestion Pricing Pilot
Program in 1993.154  It has yet to be implemented.  The local
Metropolitan Transportation Commission and the California
Department of Transportation evaluated peak period tolls, off-peak
toll discounts, and expanded transit on the Bay Bridge.
The current toll is a flat price of $1.00 for all westbound
automobiles.155  After extensive evaluation, the project proposed a
peak period toll of $3.00 for westbound traffic during morning and
evening peak periods while keeping the off-peak toll at the current
level.156  Although the Metropolitan Transportation Commission
approved the proposal at the end of 1994, the California Legislature,
which also must approve it, has not acted so far.157  The Department of
Transportation should have completed installation of electronic
148. See id.
149. See id. at 15-16.
150. See id. at 9.
151. Telephone Interview with Mike Leary, Program Administrator, Federal Highway
Administration (Aug. 5, 1997).
152. See Overview, supra note 49, at 9.
153. See id.
154. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 20.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See Overview, supra note 49, at 12.
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tolling in 1997, but congestion pricing has yet to go into effect
because of state legislative opposition.158
B.  What is an appropriate price structure for congestion pricing?
A pilot program with data showing road use during peak and off-
peak hours would be the best way to “test” an appropriate pricing
structure.  To what extent does a change in price affect roadway
use?159  The data collected to date suggest that moderate price
increases per mile driven on congested roadways, on the order of 27
cents per mile (in the case of SR 91), can substantially reduce
congestion.160  This is consistent with the impact of peak pricing on
the use of other goods, like telephones, electricity and airplane
landings, which have been in place for many years.161
The data on congestion pricing pilot programs are consistent
with data on employer-provided parking subsidies.162  The data
indicate that the ending of employer-provided parking subsidies of
employee parking affects the behavior of single-occupancy users.163  If
the average parking subsidy is a modest $3.87 per trip, the ending of
that subsidy shifts single-occupancy users into carpool arrangements
at a rate of 23 percent.164  This is similar to congestion pricing data
which suggests that peak prices that exceed off-peak prices by $2.00
per trip shift a substantial number of roadway users out of peak use.165
C.  How do communities build pubic support for congestion pricing?
The lack of widespread implementation to date can ultimately be
traced to lack of public support for the concept.  Sharply conflicting
values often accompany environmental policy making.166  Congestion
pricing is a good illustration.  It is a bitter pill for individual peak
users, but as a policy, it may improve driving conditions and air
quality for the community as a whole.
158. See id.
159. See JOHN KAIN, Impacts of Congestion Pricing on Transit and Carpool Demand and
Supply, in 2 CURBING GRIDLOCK 502, supra note 1.  Kain suggests that the costs and benefits
of implementing congestion pricing may differ greatly from one metropolitan area to another.
160. See Overview, supra note 49, at 8.  See also CALIPER CORP., supra note 18, at 59-60.
161. See GILLEN, supra note 103, at 147-48.
162. See DONALD C. SHOUP, Cashing Out Employer-Paid Parking in 2 CURBING
GRIDLOCK, supra note 1 at 152, 152-99.
163. See id. at 157.
164. See id. at 155-59.
165. See Overview, supra note 49, at 9-10.
166. See Latin, supra note 20, at 1648.
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Public resistance to congestion pricing is understandable for the
following reasons.  First, the automobile is considered central to the
American dream and represents the quintessence of personal
freedom.167  Attempts to price roadways strike at the heart of what
was previously considered free as a matter of right.  Second, the
pricing of roadways, either through uniform tolls or congestion tolls,
is seen as another form of taxation, a price that users have to pay
even if they have little choice in their use of the road.168  Third, there
is a popular misconception that the setting of variable prices will not
affect drivers’ behavior.169  Fourth, the required registration of
vehicles and the monitoring of vehicle movements is seen as an
invasion of privacy.170
At the same time, congestion pricing is likely to receive greater
acceptance in regions where tolling and electronic toll collection
already exist.  For example, in the Houston area, where the Katy
Freeway is about to introduce congestion pricing, tolling is already in
place in other nearby county highways, Beltway 8 and the Hardy Toll
Road.171  This is also the case in Westchester County where peak
pricing for trucks is underway.  In addition, the concerns about
privacy should no longer be connected solely to congestion pricing
because the system of electronic tolls will require individual motorist
accounts whether or not congestion pricing is implemented.172
D.  The imposition of congestion pricing raises equity concerns.
Proposals to adopt peak pricing raise equity concerns for those
road users who cannot afford to pay peak prices.173  Opponents argue
that congestion pricing will permit users with high incomes to travel
at the most convenient (peak) times whereas users with less resources
will be forced to travel at less convenient times at off-peak rates.174  In
the case of projects like I-15 in San Diego, it may well be that single-
driver, higher-income users are choosing to pay the premium to drive
on the HOV lane, which was previously available only to car pools.
167. See Komanoff, supra note 35, at 123.
168. See Gillen, supra note 103, at 118.
169. See id. at 117-18.
170. See id. at 118.
171. Telephone Interview with Mike Leary, supra note 151.
172. See, e.g., Neal Thompson, E-Z Pass Hits New Jersey, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.),
June 10, 1997, at A3.
173. See DOWNS, supra note 106, at 51.
174. See id.
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There is little doubt that lower-income roadway users will be
more sensitive to higher peak prices than higher-income users.  This
is true for a wide variety of goods that are priced on a peak-usage
basis, e.g., telephones, air travel, and electricity.175  The distinctive
concern with roadways is that lower-income users may have little
choice in setting their traveling hours.  If one assumes that lower-
income users are more sensitive to price increases than higher-
income users, the concern would be that lower-income users would
bear the brunt of higher peak prices and “only Lexus owners” would
be cruising through a peak-priced roadway.176
The limited data on pilot programs does not appear to address
this important issue.  Initial data on the SR 91 project seems to
indicate that the demographic characteristics of the ExpressLanes
users who pay to use it are no different than those who use the non-
toll lanes.177  However, more information on possible shifts in travel
behavior for lower-income motorists is sorely needed.  Impacts would
be harshest for households with the least flexibility, e.g., multiple-
worker households or households with young children.178  Working
women are more likely to have significant schedule constraints than
men, and thus may be disproportionately affected by such policies.179
A methodical assessment of the equity impacts of congestion
pricing is a difficult task.  An assessment is appropriate only if it can
be compared with the impact of existing transportation policy.  As set
forth in the Transportation Research Board study, no such analysis of
the distributional impacts of transportation policy has been
completed since the mid-1980s.180  However, other aspects of
transportation policy, e.g., the price of fuel and the imposition of a
gasoline tax, would fall more heavily on lower-income persons.
Establishing a baseline is only the first step in evaluating the
equity effects of congestion pricing.181  The second challenge is to
175. See generally Gillen, supra note 103.
176. See DOWNS, supra note 106, at 51; Telephone Interview with Mike Leary, supra note
151  (describing focus groups’ objections to imposition of congestion pricing).
177. Telephone Interview with John Berg, supra note 130 (describing observation that
working mother in a rush to pick up a child at day care will willingly pay the $2.75 trip fee
rather than the day care penalty for being late).
178. See GENEVIEVE GIULIANO, Equity and Fairness Considerations of Congestion Pricing,
in 2 CURBING GRIDLOCK, supra note 1, at 275.
179. See id. at 252.
180. See id.
181. See id.
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estimate the response to a specific pricing proposal.182  With projects
underway affecting private motorists in San Diego and Orange
County, California, data on distributional impacts should be collected
and methodically analyzed.
Assuming a distributional impact is found among lower-income
motorists, the electronic toll system with individual user accounts
does permit for income-based rebates.  Accordingly, motorists who
earn below a certain income level could be eligible for rebates based
on their annual usage.  This is an important technological
breakthrough which allows communities that implement congestion
pricing to correct for the impact on lower-income users.183
E.  Stronger incentives are required for localities to move forward with
congestion pricing.
As we have seen, much study but little implementation has
characterized congestion pricing, fully six years after ISTEA
provided federal funding for up to 80 percent of programming.184
Clearly, stronger incentives are required to turn public opinion and
build public support for congestion pricing.  One of the most
important incentives is continued federal funding of congestion
pricing programs.
From 1992 to 1997, ISTEA provided funding of up to $25 million
annually to support Federal participation in congestion pricing
projects.185  However, in 1995 Congress rescinded the unused balance
of pilot program funds for Fiscal Year 1995, and transferred
authorizations for FY 1996 and FY 1997 to other purposes.  This loss
of funds means that pilot program funds are not currently available
for new project starts or to support additional implementation efforts
after completion of current “pre-project” studies.186  Continued
federal support is obviously critical to maintain at least the current
level of pilot pricing activity.187
A second incentive for successful implementation of congestion
pricing would be a rebate program for individuals who shift their
182. See id.
183. See Overview, supra note 49, at 10.
184. See generally id. at 7-16.
185. See id. at 1.
186. See id. at 2.  Congress is currently considering additional funding for Fiscal Year 1998
in the current Transportation Reauthorization Bill. Telephone Interview with John Berg, Team
Leader, Federal Highway Administration (Sept. 16, 1997).
187. See discussion infra pp. 117-21.
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motor vehicle use from peak to off-peak hours.  This would directly
reward the behavior of users who refrain from driving in peak hours.
Such a rebate is administratively feasible because of the electronic
toll system which requires individual motorist accounts.188  It may also
serve in the long run to encourage employers to adopt more flexible
work schedules so that their employees are not uniformly on the road
during peak hours.
Third, the introduction of congestion pricing on one class of
vehicles only as a test of the program will probably lead to greater
acceptance.  For example, trucks contribute disproportionately to air
pollution, infrastructure wear and tear, and congestion.  Federal
tailpipe emissions for trucks lag behind those for cars.189
The public is more likely to be accepting of a program that
impacts trucks because of the general perception that trucks
contribute disproportionately to roadway congestion.  In addition,
because congestion adds to travel time, efforts to shift traffic from
peak to off-peak hours would reduce the cost of moving goods.190
Congestion pricing targeting trucks would encourage the scheduling
of trips more efficiently, and thus could result in overall productivity
increases.191  Thus, a program which begins with the congestion
pricing of trucks is more likely to be a successful “test” of the system
and gain public acceptance.192
CONCLUSION
Despite some of the uncertainties associated with implementing
congestion pricing, the benefits of implementation are likely to
outweigh its costs.  The failure of our major metropolitan areas to
attain the air quality goals of the Clean Air Act is well-documented.
The preliminary results for the programs that are just underway in
California and Westchester, New York are consistent with the
economic theory that when users are required to pay for the
congestion they impose in peak hours, the number of peak-hour trips
is reduced.193
Reducing congestion would improve air quality because
reductions in vehicle miles traveled would reduce running emissions.
188. See, e.g., Overview, supra note 49, at 9.
189. Telephone Interview with Will Ristau, supra note 145.
190. See Giuliano, supra note 159, at 268.
191. See id.
192. Telephone Interview with Will Ristau, supra note 145.
193. See generally Overview, supra note 49, at 8-16.
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Further, if the average speed of travel on a freeway were increased
from 30 to 50 mph, emission models predict a decrease in gram/mile
emission rates for carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons, although
emissions of nitrogen oxide may increase.194  Congestion pricing
would be likely to improve traffic flow and reduce overall
emissions.195  The significant acceleration and deceleration associated
with “stop and go” traffic appear to contribute to dramatic increases
in emission rates during peak travel times.196
Aside from air quality impacts, the time and cost savings to
roadway users, in this era of growing road rage, are also compelling
reasons to move forward with congestion pricing.  Congestion pricing
by itself will not bring the vast areas of this country that are in
nonattainment magically into attainment.197  However, in combination
with other tools, including the introduction of zero-emission vehicles,
improved mass transit, and stronger enforcement, attainment over
time can be achieved.
194. See GUENSLER & SPERLING, supra note 1, at 371.  Since emissions of oxides of
nitrogen contribute to ozone formation, evaluating the impact on emissions is especially critical
in areas in non-attainment for ozone.  See id. at 372.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See generally Latin, supra note 20, at 1685-86 (describing obstacles to attaining goals of
Clean Air Act).
